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Introduction 
The question of incentive compatibility was first posed in economics in relation to public goods 
provision. Consider, for example, a situation in which there are m public goods (e.g., education, 
transportation, police, etc.) that can be produced from a single private good (e.g., money). It is 
well known that if each individual is to decide his contribution for the provision of public goods 
based only on his own preferences, the resulting allocation will typically be inefficient. Lindahl[8] 
proposed a scheme for allocating public goods which, if implemented, produces efficienct outcomes. 
However, the viability of his scheme was questioned by Samuelson[12], who pointed out that 
individuals will generally have an incentive to misrepresent their preferences in order to avoid 
some of the financial burden. Hurwicz [5] showed that the problem of incentive compatibility 
is not exclusive to public goods economies, but is also present in a standard private goods-only 
economy. 
As decentralized market-like institutions are not immune to manipulation by individuals, it 
is important to determine which institutions (i.e., allocation mechanisms) are compatible with 
individual incentives. An allocation mechanism can be thought of as a mapping that associates a 
feasible allocation with every profile of individuals' preferences1. Incentive compatible allocation 
mechanisms are those for which an individual is always best off reporting his true preferences (Le., 
where reporting one's true preferenc~s must be a dominant strategy in the game form defined 
by the allocation mechanism). Allocation mechanisms having this property are referred to as 
strategy-proof· 
Although the notion of incentive compatibility associated with strategy-proofness is very strong, 
it is the appropriate condition if one is to consider allocation problems in which individuals have 
imperfect and asymmetric information about other individuals' preferences. Alternatively, one 
could introduce explicitly each individual's information and beliefs about the other individuals' 
preferences, and model the situation as a game of incomplete information. In this context, incen-
tive compatibility would require that reporting one's true type be a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. 
Individuals beliefs, however, are usually unknown. Thus, if an allocation mechanism is to satisfy 
this requirement for all possible profiles of individuals' beliefs, then an individual must be best off 
almost always reporting his true preferences (see Ledyard[7]). Hence requiring that true reporting 
be a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for all possible beliefs is virtually equivalent to requiring that the 
mechanism be strategy-proof. 
10nly direct revelation mechanisms are considered here. However I the revelation principle tells us that this can 
be done without loss of generality. 
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This paper provides a characterization of the class of strategy-proof allocation mechanisms 
for decision problems in classical economic environments. It is shown that when at least one 
public good is provided, then only dictatorial allocation mechanisms are incentive compatible. 
Dictatorial mechanisms are very unsatisfactory as any conflict of interests is always resolved in 
favor of a single individual (the dictator). This result reveals a basic incompatibility between 
individual incentives and any other desirable property (e.g., any kind of efficiency, fairness, etc.) 
of an allocation mechanism. In particular, incentive compatible allocation mechanisms typically 
produce inefficient outcomes. 
Previous results have established the impossibility of designing incentive compatible alloca-
tion mechanisms that produce Pareto optimal outcomes. For example, Hurwicz[5] establishes this 
impossibility for a standard two person-two goods pure exchange private economy when the al-
location mechanisms must produce also individually rational outcomes. Zhou[16] shows that the 
impossibility remains even if the requirement of individual rationality is removed. For economies 
including one private good (on which individuals' preferences are assumed to be linear) and one or 
more public goods, Green and Laffont[4] characterize the strategy-proof mechanisms that allocate 
public goods efficiently as Groves mechanisms; since mechanisms in this class are generally unbal-
anced, their characterization implies that strategy-proof allocation mechanisms cannot always yield 
Pareto efficient outcomes. Also under the strong assumption of quasi-linear preferences, Hurwicz 
and Vvalker[6] show that strategy-proof allocation mechanisms will generally produce inefficient 
outcomes (their results apply to pure exchange private goods economies as well as economies with 
public goods). 
Since the set of Pareto optimal outcomes is typically a small subset of the set of feasible 
outcomes, the results just described give rise to the question whether it might be possible to find 
strategy-proof allocation mechanisms that are not too far (in some sense) from being efficient. 
The characterization presented here shows that for most economies such allocation mechanisms do 
not exist, as dictatorial allocation mechanisms produce generally inefficient outcomes2 • Moreover, 
these results are obtained without restricting individuals' preferences to be representable by quasi-
linear utility functions, which is a small set of preferences in the domain of preferences usually 
associated with economic environments (e.g., preferences that are continuous, monotonic, convex, 
2Notable exceptions are economies with only public goods. For private goods-only economies, the (very unsatis-
factory) allocation mechanisms that give the existing amounts of goods to a single individual (always the same) are 
dictatorial and produce Pareto optimal outcomes. (Zhou[16] shows that for a two-person pure exchange economy 
this is the unique strategy-proof allocation mechanism that produces Pareto optimal outcomes.) 
etc.). 
The problem of incentive compatibility also arises in political environments (e.g., when a group 
of public officials must be chosen from a pool of candidates, or a public project from a set of feasible 
projects must be selected). In this context, it has been shown that when individuals' preferences 
are unrestricted, strategy-proof decision mechanisms are dictatorial (Gibbard[3], Satterthwaite[13], 
Barbera and Peleg[l], Zhou[15]). 
Using this approach, Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein[14] have established that strategy-proof 
nonbossy3 differentiable allocation mechanisms are locally serially dietatoriart. However, the im-
plications of these results are unclear (the hierarchies of dictators might differ for different profiles, 
each individual's choice set might be independent of the other individuals choices), and the con-
ditions under which allocation mechanisms are globally serially dictatorial are hard to check, and 
in fact they require one to know the specific allocation mechanism that is to be used5 • Moreover, 
nonbossiness is not an inexcusable condition which cannot be abandoned if a mechanism has other 
desirable properties. 
The present theorems improve upon Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein results in that they es-
tablish that for economies with at least a public good all strategy-proof allocation mechanisms 
(bossy or nonbossy, differentiable or non differentiable) are (globally) dictatorial. The theorems 
are silent, however, about economies with private goods only, as nondictatorial and strategy-proof 
allocation mechanisms do exist in this case: For example, consider an economy in which there 
are two private goods, x and y, and three individuals. The economy is endowed with three units 
of x and nothing of y; but y can be produced with constant returns to scale using x as input. 
Let the allocation mechanism f assign to individuals 1, 2 and 3 their most preferred consumption 
bundle whose cost in term of x does not exceed, respectively, 1 + m2 - ma, 1 + ma - ml and 
1 +ml - m2 units of x, where mi is zero if Individual i's utility at zero is positive, and is one 
3A mechanism is nonbossy if no individual can change some other individual's outcome (by changing the utility 
function he reports) and maintain his own. 
"Serially dictatorial mechanism are those which determine the allocation by fixing a hierarchy of individual 
where the highest ranked individuals chooses his outcome from a set of outcomes exogenously given, the second 
ranked individual chooses his outcome from a set determined by the first individual's choice, and so on. 
5This is so ev~n for allocation mechanisms on public goods only economies: For example, when individual 
preferences are representable by continuous convex preferences, then medium voter type mechanisms are strategy-
proof and locally dictatorial, but they are not dictatorial when their range is a one dimensional set (see Moulin[lO]). 
Zhou[14] has shown that when the range is a higher dimensional set, then all strategy-proof mechanisms on this 
domain of preferences are dictatorial. 
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otherwise. This allocation mechanism is strategy-proof (no individual can influence his own out-
come), and, if individuals' preferences are monotonic, it produces Pareto optimal outcomes. (This 
is a slightly modified version of an example discussed in Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein[14]. For 
pure exchange private goods-only economies, Barbera and Jackson[2] have recently characterized 
the class of strategy-proof anonymous and nonbossy allocation mechanisms as those for which 
individuals trade according to fixed exogenously given proportions.) 
2. The Model 
The set of individuals is N = {l, ... ,n}, where n ~ 1. Each individual consumption set is of the 
form X x Yi eR+: x R~. The set of feasible allocations is denoted by Z, a compact subset of 
X x n~ Yi. Thus, the coordinate members of X are public goods, while the other coordinates are 
private goods or externalities which might or might not be fully public goods6 • This representation 
allows consideration of all possible allocation problems: pure public goods economies (for which the 
sets Yi are singletons), economies with only private goods (for which the set X is a singleton), and 
mixed economies (economies with public goods as well as private goods and other externalities). 
Individual i's preferences are represented by utility functions (i.e., real-valued functions on 
X x Yi). Individuals utility functions might be known to have certain properties (e.g., to be 
continuous, or to be increasing in certain dimensions). Thus, for each individual i E N, let Vi 
denote the set of a priori admissible utility functions. (When admissible utility functions are 
assumed to be quasi-concave, then the set X x Yi is assumed to be convex.) The set of admissible 
utility profiles is therefore U =n~Vi' Utility profiles are denoted by U = (UI' ... , un). For U E U and 
S C N, U-s is the profile obtained from u by deleting the utility functions of the members of S. 
For each point or subset A of Z, write A and Ax for the projections of A into, respectively, 
X x Yi and X. Hence for each Z E Z, Zi is the bundle of goods received by Individual i, and Zx is 
the provision of public goods. Also, for an arbitrary set A C Rn, #A denotes its cardinality, and 
dimA its dimension (the dimension of the smallest affine subspace that contains it). 
An allocation mechanism is a mapping f : U -+ Z. An allocation mechanism f is manipulable by 
i E N at u E U if there is u~ E Vi such that Ui(ji(U-i, uD) > Ui(ji(U)), An allocation mechanism is 
strategy proofif it is not manipulable by any i E N at any U E U. Given an allocation mechanism 
f, write Zf for its range. An allocation mechanism is dictatorial if there is an individual i E N 
such that for each U E U, fi(U) maximizes Ui on Z/ (and Individual i is referred to as the dictator 
6In the framework provided here, an allocation problem might be representable in different ways, depending on 
which of the public goods we choose to include in the set X. 
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for I). 
It should be noticed that the definition of dictatorial mechanisms given here is weaker than 
the one usually' encountered in the social choice framework. Here the dictator preferences need 
only determine the dictator's consumption bundle. Of course, any conflict of interests between 
the dictators and other individuals is always solved in favor of the dictator. If for example there 
are public goods whose provision has to be decided, the decision will be made based solely on the 
dictator's preferences. Thus, for economies with only public goods, this notion is the usual one. 
Barbera and Peleg[l], and Zhou[15] have established that a strategy-proof allocation mechanism 
for a pure public good economy must be dictatorial. In the present framework these theorems can 
be formulated as follows: 
Theorem (Barbera and Peleg[l)): Let f : U -+ Z be a strategy-proof allocation mechanism. If 
#Zf ~ 3 and for each i E N, Yi is a singleton and Ui contains all the continuous utility functions, 
then f is dictatorial. 
Theorem (Zhou[15]7): Let f : U -+ Z be a strategy-proof allocation mechanism. If dimZ f ~ 2 and 
for each i E N,'Yi is a singleton and Ui contains all the continuous quasi-concave utility functions, 
then f is dictatorial. 
For the general class of allocation problems considered here, there might be certain natural 
restrictions on individuals' admissible utility functions. For example, if the non-public dimensions 
of the allocation problem are private goods that are always desirable or freely disposable, then 
admissible utility functions must be increasing in those dimensions. Thus, for each i E N, a utility 
function Ui is said to be Yi-increasing if for all Yi, y~ E Yi with Yi > y~, one has Ui(X, Yi) ~ Ui(X, yD. 
When the inequality is strict, Ui is said to be strictly Yi-increasing (The convention used for vector 
inequalities is as follows: For a, b E Rn, a ~ b iff ai ~ bi for all i = 1, ... , n; a > b iff a ~ b 
and a f. b.) Note that utility functions Ui that are constant in the non-public dimensions are 
Yi-increasing according to this definition. 
3. The results 
Theorems 1 and 2 bellow apply to allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods. Theo-
rem 1 establishes that every strategy-proof allocation mechanism which has to decide the provision 
of one or several public goods must be dictatorial, even restricting the sets of admissible utility 
7This formulation of Zhou's theorem is not the most general possible. In fact, his theorem only requires that all 
quadratic utility functions be admissible. The formulation presented here, however, makes it easier to relate the 
theorem with the assumptions on preferences most common in economic environments. 
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functions to contain only functions that are increasing in the non-public dimensions. Theorem 2 
establishes an identical result for continuous allocation mechanisms, when admissible utility func-
tions are required to be strictly Yi-increasing. Both these theorems contain Barberit and Peleg's 
and Zhou's theorems as particular cases-however, these theorems play a fundamental role in their 
proofs-as well as Moreno and Walker's Theorem[9], and Theorem 2 in Moreno[lO]. 
Theorem 1: Let f : U -+ Z be a strategy-proof allocation mechanism. If either 
(1.1) #Z! ~ 3'andfor each i E N, Uj contains all the continuous Yj-increasing utility functions, 
or 
(1.2) dimZ! ~ 2, and for each i E N, Ui contains all the continuous quasi-concave Yi-increasing 
utility functions) 
then f is dictatorial. 
It should be noticed that Theorem 1 does not require that the non-public dimensions be private 
goods. Goods can be of any nature (private goods, public goods or other externalities): It is only 
required that utility functions increasing in specified dimensions be admissible. Also note that the 
conditions on the set Z! effectively require the presence of public goods in the allocation problem. 
As the example in the introduction shows, strategy-proof nondictatorial allocation mechanisms do 
exist when public goods are absent from the allocation problem. 
Theorem 1 is proved by first showing that under the assumptions of the theorem, the restriction 
of any strategy-proof allocation mechanism to the set of utility profiles for which all of its coordinate 
utility functions are constant on the non-public goods is dictatorial (Lemma 1). The theorem is 
then proved by showing that the dictator in this subdomain is also a dictator in the whole domain. 
For each i E N, write Ut for the set of utility functions uf E Ui of the form uf(x, Yi) = v(x), 
where v is a real valued function on X (i.e., the set of utility functions that are constant in the 
non-public dimensions), and let UX denote the set TI~ Ut-
Lemma 1: Let f be a strategy-proof allocation mechanism satisfying the assumptions of Theorem 
1. Then the restriction of f to UX is dictatorial. 
Proof: Let y E TI~ Yi arbitrary, and for each i E N, let Ui denote the set of utility functions 
on X x {yd that are restrictions of functions on Ui. Note that the sets Uj and U{ can be put in 
a one to one correspondence; i.e., for each Uj E Uj, there is one and only one uf E Ut such that 
Uj(x, Yi) = uf(x, Yi), for each (x, Yi) E X x Yi. Write Ui :::::: uf when the functions Ui and uf are 
related in this way. 
Write D =. TI~ Oi, and Z = Zx x {y}, and define the allocation mechanism f : D -tZ by 
/(u) = (fx(UX),y), where UX E ux is such that for each i E N, Ui ::::: ufo Clearly, f is strategy-
proof. Suppose not; let j E N, u E D, and uj E D be such that Uj(jj(U-i,ui)) > uj(/Au)), and 
let U XE ux, ujX E Ut be such that for each i E N, Ui ::::: uf, and uj ::::: ut Then one has 
and therefore f is manipulable by Individual j at UXE U X, which contradicts that f is strategy-
proof. Hence / is strategy-proof. 
Next, it is shown that Z! = Z{ Obviously Z! C Z{ To show that Z! ~ Zl, let x E Zl, and 
let u E U be such that fx(u) = x. Let UXE UX be such that for each i E N, uf(x, Yi) = v(x), where 
v has x as its unique maximizer. Since f is strategy-proof, one has fx(U-b Ul) = x (otherwise 
Individual 1 can manipulate f at u). Similarly, 
Now let U E D be such that for each i E N, Ui ::::: uf; then one has fx(u) =fx(uX) = X. Hence 
- Zlx E x. 
If assumption (1.1) of Theorem 1 holds, then the Barbera and Peleg's Theorem implies that 
/ is dictatorial. If (1.2) of Theorem 1 holds, then Zhou's Theorem implies that f is dictatorial. 
Therefore in either case, / is dictatorial; i.e., there is j E N such that for each u E D, /j(u) 
maximizes Uj on Z£. This in fact implies that for each UXE U X, h(uX ) maximizes uj on Z; i.e., 
that the restriction of f to UX is dictatorial.D 
In order to establish Lemma 2, some additional notation has to be introduced. For each i E N 
and Ai C X x ri, denote by Ai the set of Yi-maximal points-i.e., the points (x, Yi) E Ai for 
which there is no (x, yi) E Ai such that yi > Yi. Lemma 2 establishes that when an allocation 
mechanism is q.ictatorial, the set of Yi-maximal points of the projection of its range into the 
dictator's consumption set must be closed. 
Lemma 2: Let f : U -t Z be an allocation mechanism. If Individual i is a dictator for f and Ui 
contains all the continuous concave Yi-increasing utility functions on Zi, then Z! is closed. 
Proof: Let (x, f}i) in the closure of zf, Let u E U be such that Ui is given for each (x, Yi) E Zi 
by 
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Since Individual i is a dictator for f, and for each (x, Yi) E Z/ \ {(x, ili)} one has Ui(X, Yi) > 
Ui(X, Yi) , then fi( Ui, U-i) = (x, Yi). Hence (x, Yi) E Z/.D 
PROOF OF THEOREM 1: The theorem is proved by induction on the number of individuals. Let 
f be a strategy-proof allocation mechanism satisfying the assumptions of Theorem 1. It is shown 
that f is dictatorial. 
The case n = 1 is simple. Suppose that for some Ul E VI there is (x, YI) E ZJ such that 
UI(X,YI) > UI(f(UI))' Since (X,YI) E ZJ, let u~ E VI be such that f(uD = (X,YI)' Then one has 
and therefore f is manipulable by Individual 1 at U1, which contradicts that f is strategy-proof. 
Thus, for each UI E VI and each (X,YI) E ZJ, one has UI(f(UI)) ~ UI(X,YI), and therefore 
Individual 1 is the dictator for f (i.e., f is dictatorial). 
Assuming that Theorem 1 holds for n ~ k - 1, it remains to be shown that it holds for n = k. 
Henceforth assume, without loss of generality (w.l.o.g.), that Individual 1 is the dictator for the 
restriction of f to UX(Lemma 1). We show that he is in fact a dictator for f. 
For an arbitrary U2 E V2, let the mapping jU2 : n~ Vi --. Z be given for each U-2 E rH Vi by 
jU2(U_2) = f(U2' U-2)' The mapping jU2 can be regarded as an allocation mechanism, and the 
notions of strategy-proofness and dictatorship, as well as the previous lemmas, apply to it. 
It is easy to show that if f is strategy-proof, then jU2 is strategy-proof also. Suppose not; let 
i E N \ {2}, U-2 E rH Vj , and u~ E Vi be such that ui(fr(U-{i,2},uD) > ui(fr(U-2))' Hence 
and therefore f is manipulable by Individual i at (U-2' U2) E U, contradicting that f is strategy-
proof. 
Next, it is shown that zt2 = Z;. Since zt2 c Zl, it needs to be shown that zt2 ::> Z;. 
Let x E Zl, and suppose that x tt zt2. Let uf E Vf be such that uf(x, YI) = v(x), where v 
has x as its unique maxim~zer. As x tt zt2, then jU2(U_{I,2}' uf) = (x',y), satisfies x' =1= x; i.e., 
fx(U-{I,2},uf,U2) = x' =1= x. For i E N \ {I}, let uf E Vt be such that Uf(X,Yi) = v'(x), where is 
v' has x' as its unique maximizer. Since f is strategy-proof one has 
But notice that U X E ux, and therefore this contradicts that Individual 1 is the dictator for the 
restriction of f to UX. Hence zt2 ::> Zl· 
Thus, r·2 is a strategy-proof allocation mechanism involving k-1 individuals and since zt2 = 
Z!, it satisfies the assumptions of Theorem 1. The induction hypothesis therefore implies that it 
is dictatorial. It is now shown that in fact Individual 1 (the dictator for the restriction of f to UX) 
must be the dictator for r· 2 also. 
Suppose not; since f11 2 is dictatorial, w.l.o.g. assume that Individual 3 is the dictator for f11 2 • 
Let x,x' E zt2 = Z!, x =I x', and let uf E Ut, be such that uf(x,yI) = v(x), where v has x as 
its unique maximizer, and for i E N \ {I}, let uf E Ur be such that Uf(X,Yi) = v'(x), where v' 
has x' as its unique maximizer. As Individual 3 is the dictator for f11 2 , then f: 2 (uf, u~, ... , u~) = 
fx(uf, U2, u~, ... , u~) = x', and since f is strategy-proof, one has fx(uf, u~, u~, ... , u~) = fx(u X ) = x'. 
But notice that U X E ux, which contradicts that Individual 1 is the dictator for the restriction of 
f to UX. Hence Individual 1 is the dictator for f11 2 • 
Finally, it is' shown that Individual 1 is the dictator for f. Suppose not; let u E U, (x, yI) E Z{ 
be such that ul(x,ih) > ul(h(u)). Since Individual 1 is the dictator for f11 2 , then (x,ih) t/: zt2 • 
Choose (x, Yl) be Yrmaximal in the closure of Z{ (note that at this point it is unknown whether 
or not this set is closed). Let (x, yD E zt2 be such that fh > y~ (recall zt2 is closed from Lemma 
2), and let Ul E Ul be a concave utility function satisfying (see Figu~ 
(a.1) Ul(X,Yl) > Ul(X,Yl), for all (X,Yl) E zt2 , and 
(a.2) Ul(X,Yl) > ul(x,yD, for some (X,Yl) E zt2 with x =I x. 
Write f: 2 (U-{1,2), uI) = x. Since Individual 1 is the dictator for f11 2 , (a.2) implies x =I x. Now 
let U2(X, Y2) = v(x), where v is an arbitrary function which unique maximizer on Z! is x. Since f 
is strategy-proof, then fx(U-{1,2}, Ull U2) = x, and since Individual 1 is the dictator for jiJ.2, (a.1) 
implies (x,yI) t/: zt2 • 
As (x, yI) is in the closure of Z{ and (x, Yl) rf. zt2 , let U2 E U2 be such that there is (x, yn E 
Z("2 (recall th(~.t zt2 = Z!), and such that there is no (x, yI) E Z("2 for which Yl ~ y~' (hence 
(x,y~') f/. z(2 ). Also let (x,ilI) E zt2 such that x f/. {x,x}. (If assumption (1.2) of Theorem 1 
holds, then x, x, xcan be chosen in general position, and such that A(X, yn +(1- A)(X, yI) f/. zt2 
for each A E [0, 1)-see Figure 1.) Finally, let Ul E Ul satisfying 
(b.1) (x, y~') uniquely maximizes Ul on zt2 , and 
(b.2) (x, yd uniquely maximizes Ul on zt2 • 
(If assumption (1.2) of Theorem 1 holds, then the choice of (x, y~') and (x, Yl) allows one to find a 
concave utility function with properties (b.1) and (b.2).) 
Since Individual 1 is the dictator for both fU2 and r' 2 , one has ft 2 (U-{1,2}' Ul) = fl (U-{1,2}, Ul, U2) = 
(x, Yl), and ft 2 (U-{1,2), Ul) = h (U-{1,2), Ull U2) = (x, Y~'). Because v is an arbitrary function having 
-,,--------
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X as its unique maximizer, it can be chosen such that £'(x) > £,(x). Hence 
Therefore f is manipulable by Individual 2 at (U-{1,2), UI, U2)' This contradiction shows that 
no point (x, ih)·exists, thereby establishing Theorem 1.0 
Note that the admissibility of utility functions that are constant in the non-public goods IS 
fundamental in the proof of Theorem 1. Thus, it will be of interest to determine whether the 
conclusions of Theorem 1 arise when only utility function strictly increasing in the non-public di-
mensions are admissible. Theorem 2 establishes that when the allocation mechanism is continuous, 
an identical result holds. 
Write Vc for the set of all the utility profiles that are continuous on Z. The set Vc together 
with the distance d, given for each u, u' E Vc by 
d( u, u') = max{ IUi(Zi) - u~(zD I, z, z' E Z, i EN}, 
form a metric space, and the notion of continuity of an allocation mechanism has the standard 
formulation. 
Theorem 2: Let f : V ---+ Z be a strategy-proof allocation mechanism. If V C Vc, f is continuous 
on V, and either 
(2.1) #Zl ~ 3 and for each i E N, Ui contains all the continuous and strictly Yi-increasing utility 
functions, or 
(2.2) dimZl ~ 2, and for each i E N, Vi contains all the continuous quasi-concave and strictly 
Yi-increasing utility functions) 
then f is dictatorial. 
Proof: Let f be an allocation mechanism satisfying the assumptions of Theorem 2. In order 
to show that f is dictatorial, a strategy-proof extension of f to the set of all continuous profiles 
whose coordinates are (weakly) Yi-increasing utility functions is. Theorem 1 therefore implies that 
this extension must be dictatorial, thereby establishing that f must be dictatorial. 
For each i E N, denote by W i the set of all the continuous and Yi-increasing functions on Zi, 
and write W = TI~ W i. For each i E N, and Ui E W i, define the function uf E Ui given for each 
uf(x, Yi) = Ui(X, Yi) + ~IIYill. 
For any u E W, let L(u) be the set of limit points of the sequence {f(uk )} • Note that since Z is 
compact, the set L(u) is nonempty (and closed) for each u E V. Let <P be an arbitrary selection 
Ifunction, which for each u E V picks a point z in L(u). Finally, define the mapping F : W --+ Z 
by F(u) = q!>(u). Note that since f is continuous on V, one has F(u) = f(u) for u E V (the set 
L(u) is a singleton in this case). 
It is shown that F is strategy-proof. Suppose it is not; let i E N, u E W, and ui E Wi be 
such that ui(Fi(u-i, ui)) > ui(Fi(u)). Since Ui is continuous and Z is compact, there are h, h'> 0 
and an integer R such that for each k > k, and Zi, zi E Zi such that IIzi - Fi(u) 11 < hand 
Ilzi - Fi(U-i, un 11 < h', one has 
From the definition of F, there are k, k' > f< such that both IIFi(Uk) - Fi(u)1I < ~ and 
IIFi(U~i,uik) - Fi(u-i,uDII < h'. (If u or (U-i,ui) are in V, this is possible because f is con-
tinuous; otherwise this is possible because F(u) and F(U_i, un are limit points of {F(uk)} and 
{F(U~i' u?)}, respectively.) Moreover, k, k' can be chosen sufficiently large that also IIFi(U k') -
Fi(uk)11 < ~ (recall that for all uk, F(uk) = f(u k), and that f is continuous on V). Then one has 
Note, however, that both uk' and (U~i' uik') are members of V; hence Fi(U k') = fi(U k'), and 
Fi(U~i' u?') = fi(U~i' uik'), which implies that f is manipulable by Individual i at uk'. This con-
tradiction shows that F is strategy-proof, thereby establishing Theorem 2.0 
4. Conclusions 
The only allocation problems that are left out of the scope of theorems 1 and 2 are those in which 
no public goods have to be provided; but as the example in the introduction shows, the absence of 
public goods from the allocation problem might allow one to find strategy-proof and nondictatorial 
allocation mechanisms. The results presented here together with the results provided by Barbed!, 
and Jackson[2] show the kinds of strategy-proof allocation mechanisms that one can design in 
economic environments. It is an open question which allocation mechanisms can be designed for 
pure private goods economies with production, or for economies with externalities that are not 
fully public goods. It seems as if no simple characterization results can be hoped for in these cases. 
Also it seems as if results similar to theorems 1 and 2 ought to hold even when individuals' 
utility functions are further restricted to be increasing in the public goods. The method of proof 
used here might be useful in proving such results, although this would require one to obtain 
theorems similar to Barbera and Peleg's and Zhou's theorems for public goods-only economies 
when individuals utility functions are known to be increasing. 
1---
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Finally, it would be of interest to determine minimal restrictions on domain of preferences 
and/or minimal dimensionality of the allocation problems for which one can find strategy-proof 
and nondictatorial allocation mechanisms. 
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